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al SoComparative-effectiveness research (CER),which is not a newcon-
cept, has succeeded evidence-basedmedicine as the current fash-
ion. In the old days of evidence-based medicine, active treatment
comparators were not banned and one of the major concerns was
the choice of outcomes important to and for patients. For instance,
high blood pressure itself is an asymptomatic condition, but its
devastating clinical complications such as a heart attack or a
stroke are not. So, the twomovements are similar, one succeeding
the other. Perhaps the major difference is the existence of the
legislative mandate (PL 111-148), which at once enables and con-
strains CER.
In a Medline search, I found 44,344 citations for the venerable
discipline of evidence-based medicine, 17,140 for the up-and-
coming genre of CER, but only 8 for the much-avoided option of
opinion-basedmedicine. No one I knowboasts a serious allegiance
to opinion-based medicine. This one-sided distribution of pub-
lished studies strikes epidemiologists like me as odd. Evidence is
generally clear; but its validity, interpretation, and generalizability
remain a source of active contention. The appeals to evidence,
reason, and science are almost universal; but these rhetorical de-
vices may do little to clarify the nature of the process and the
disagreements, which often reflect differences in values and as-
sumptions. Indeed, the models of the behavioral economists may
providemore insight into this historical process than the rational-
choice models of the traditional economists.
For example, the Systolic Hypertension Evaluation Program
(SHEP) randomized older adults to low-dose diuretics or placebo,
and the resultswere published in 1991 [1]. Low-dose diureticswere
associated with a major reduction in the risk of stroke or heart
attack. The number needed to treat to prevent one serious cardio-
vascular event was about 120 persons for 1 year. Insofar as evi-
dence matters, if we properly apply the findings from a treatment
trial of low-dose diuretics, the expected effect of SHEP results on
the hypertension drug treatment patterns of older adults in the
United States is a dramatic increase in the use of diuretics in this
patient group.
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lication of SHEP results raise questions about the relationship be-
tween evidence and practice, one that may limit the impact of
evidence generated from CER studies. In a report from the Cardio-
vascular Health Study, a cohort study of older adults [2], the use of
thiazide diuretics dropped precipitously from 60% in 1990 to 38%
in 1999. This trend looks like the public-health response to amajor
safety alert and not an appropriate response to new evidence of
the efficacy of low-dose diuretics. Before late 1997, there was no
evidence of health benefits associated with the use of calcium
antagonists and angiotensin-converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitors
[3]; yet despite the absence of evidence of efficacy and safety, the
use of both drug classes increased from about 15% in 1990 up to
about 37% in 1999. SHEP evaluated low-dose diuretics; but without
any evidence, the findings were generalized to all forms of drug
treatment for hypertension. These trends reflect not the play of
evidence but the power of marketing. Despite the safety, the ef-
fectiveness, and the low cost of diuretics—a month’s supply costs
less than a cup of Starbuck’s coffee—the rational-choice theory
does not serve as a good model of the medical community’s re-
sponse to the emergence of high-quality evidence from SHEP, a
high-quality randomized trial.
As the number of new therapies increases, comparative stud-
ies become especially important. My first epidemiologic studywas
an observational case–control study of the association between
antihypertensive drug use and the risk of coronary heart disease
[4,5]. At the time, randomized trials that had evaluated high-dose
diuretics against placebo in patients with hypertension showed
reduced risks of major cardiovascular events [6]. In postmyocar-
dial infarction patients, the randomized trials had provided evi-
dence of the health benefits associated with the use of beta-block-
ers [7]. Although both diuretics and beta-blockers were approved
for the treatment of hypertension, all the active-treatment com-
parative trials, save one [8], had focused only on the short-term
outcomes of levels of blood pressure or side effects. As a young
epidemiologist, I was struck by the extraordinary research oppor-
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HMO such as Group Health. Specifically, they included the possi-
bility of 1) complete case ascertainment, 2) population-based con-
trols, and 3) computerized pharmacy records to assess drug use.
With the advent of electronicmedical records, some of these same
features are attractive to CER scientists.
These pharmacoepidemiological studies are early examples of
observational CER. The primary rationale for the use of a compar-
ative designwas an epidemiological one.Wewanted to avoid con-
founding by indication [9]. In an observational study of hyperten-
sion treatment, it is simply not possible to compare treated and
untreated patients for cardiovascular outcomes. The treated pa-
tients have hypertension that is more severe, more difficult to
control, andmore resistant to nonpharmacologicmeasures. In the
absence of randomization, a naive observational comparison be-
tween treated and untreated patients will paradoxically show an
increased risk of cardiovascular events associatedwith antihyper-
tensive drug treatment. The use of an active-treatment compari-
son group reduces but does not eliminate the problem of con-
founding by indication, and so other techniques, including
restriction and adjustment, are also necessary.
Wewere interested in both the benefits and the harms, and the
comparative element was useful even in the evaluation of safety,
where confounding by indication is less likely to be a problem.
Stopping the use of beta-blockers, tracked by the pharmacy data,
was associated with a transient increase in the risk of coronary
heart disease [5]. In the safety study, the increased risk was spe-
cific to stopping beta-blockers but not to stopping diuretics.
In the evaluation of medications, even though randomized tri-
als are the preferred design, observational studies may on occa-
sion have a role to play. Partly because of the results of SHEP and
the marketing efforts of the industry, the 1990s witnessed an epi-
demic of licit drug use for the treatment of hypertension. The Food
and Drug Administration (FDA) had approved antihypertensive
drugs solely on the basis of their ability to lower blood pressure in
short-term studies. For new classes of medications, placebo-con-
trolled trials evaluating major health outcomes had not been con-
ducted. Given the different biological mechanisms for the four
major drug classes—diuretics, beta-blockers, ACE inhibitors, and
calcium antagonists—it would be astonishing if they were all to
have the same effect on outcomes such as myocardial infarction,
heart failure, and stroke. Manufacturers were aggressively adver-
tising the new ACE inhibitors and calcium antagonists, often on
the basis of side-effect profiles. Indeed, marketing had driven the
prevalence of use so high that another observational study of the
comparative effectiveness ofmajor health outcomeswas possible.
In our case–control study [10], short-acting calcium antago-
nists were associated with an increased risk of myocardial infarc-
tion. The associationwas robust.We could notmake it go away. In
themeta-analysis of randomized trials [11], the short-acting nifed-
ipine was associated with a dose-related increase in the risk of
total mortality. Well aware of the limitations of observational
studies, we used the results to advocate for the conduct of large
high-quality, long-term randomized trials to evaluate the compar-
ative health risks and benefits of drugs that were being used by
tens of millions of people. Although or perhaps because we con-
duct observational studies, we believed then and still believe that
the optimal method of evaluating drugs for effectiveness is the
randomized trial.
The response to our CER epidemiological studies may have
been shaped by other cultural influences of the time. These stud-
ies were published during a previous era of partisan bitterness
when Newt Gingrich had came to power in the House and legiti-
mized an aggressive take-no-prisoners style of discourse [12].
Manufacturers with strong financial interests issued, often by fax,
critiques that attempted to discredit us and our studies. One phar-
maceutical company used the Washington State freedom-of-in-formation law to harass those of us who were state employees.
Academic cardiologists, not usually known for their epidemiolog-
ical wisdom, were paid large fees to wander about the country and
opine solemnly about the design and conduct of case–control
studies. Too often, the style resembled not scientific discourse but
the aggressive marketing chatter, the partisan wrangling, and the
combative attacks of political campaigns [12].
Early in my career, I had received a grant award from the Soci-
ety of Epidemiological Research, one thatwas funded by theMerck
Company Foundation. At the time, Merckmade ACE inhibitors but
not calcium antagonists, and I was accused by the manufacturers
of calcium antagonists of working for the ACE-inhibitor compa-
nies. These kinds of bizarre experiences persuaded me that if I
wanted to work in the area of drug safety, I could not work safely
for any drug manufacturer. For the most part, I have remained
clean and sober since that time. As academic scientists, my col-
leagues and I nonetheless chose to capitalize on these experiences
by writing about them in the New England Journal of Medicine [12].
Perhaps most interesting are the unintended consequences.
The pharmaceutical manufacturers effectively promoted and
publicized what would otherwise have been several minor epide-
miologic studies. For me personally, the decision not to seek or
accept consulting frompharmaceutical companies provided novel
future opportunities: The absence of financial conflicts of interest
helped me to qualify as an expert witness at Senator Grassley’s
hearing on Vioxx (Merck & Co., Inc., Whitehouse Station, NJ) and
for two Institute of Medicine committees on drug safety and the
FDA. Unexpectedly and unintentionally, our work also turned out
to be quite valuable for the industry as well. The attention to the
risks associatedwith the generic short-acting calcium antagonists
helped promote the switch to long-acting still-on-patent trade cal-
cium antagonists. This narrative illustrates some of the ways in
which the practice and history of medicine are not rational, scien-
tific, or evidence-based activities.What I have described is a social
and political processwith various competing interests, somemore
powerful than others. Insights from the behavioral economists
may provide guidance for shaping the future narrative.
For the CER initiative, the quality of the data and the quality
of the design may on occasion be more important than the tradi-
tional distinction between observational studies and randomized
trials. In a commentary, Hennekens and Demets [13] emphasize
the need for large-scale randomized evidence. As a society, we do
not want drugs widely used on the basis of questionable evidence.
High-quality trials, including comparative trials, are essential to
progress in American medicine. The authors have selected, how-
ever, an unfortunate example—the RECORD (Rosiglitazone Evalu-
ated for Cardiac Outcomes and Regulation of Glycemia in Diabe-
tes) trial [14]. This study compared the diabetes medication
rosiglitazone with other active treatments in an open-label ran-
domized trial. Even in the presence of a “blinded” adjudication
panel, open-label trials create opportunities for bias that may be
more extreme than the biases encountered in observational stud-
ies. As part of the review of rosiglitazone, Marciniak [15], an FDA
scientist, reviewed the investigators’ decisions to refer a sample of
potential events to the blinded adjudication panel. He detected a
total of 70 errors: 57 favored rosiglitazone and only 13 favored the
control. In other words, the errors in outcome assessments were
four times more likely to occur in favor of rosiglitazone than the
other active treatments. Indeed, for both observational studies
and randomized trials, the quality of the design often influences
the quality of the data.
As Rubin [16] has emphasized, the design and conduct of ob-
servational CER is exquisitely difficult. Propensity scores, devel-
oped by Rosenbaum and Rubin [17], will not transform observa-
tional studies into the evidence equivalent of randomized trials. A
key feature of all studies is internal validity, without which the
question of generalizability does not arise. To ensure internal va-
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may severely limit the populations that can be included and eval-
uated confidently [18]. In addition, confounding by indication is a
major problem in the observational study of efficacy or effective-
ness. For example, the reported reduction in mortality risk asso-
ciated with influenza vaccine in an observational study is simply
too large to be credibly explained by the attack rate and the case-
fatality rate of influenza [19,20]. On the other hand, for safety out-
omes, meta-analyses of observational studies and randomized
rials have provided remarkably similar findings [21]. Finally, data
nd design quality may be more important than the sample size.
ith the advent of large databases, we have the opportunity to
onduct large simple observational studies, but in the absence of
igh-quality data, we may find ourselves with excessively precise
nd extremely biased estimates of associations.
How will the CER initiative and the evidence that it produces
nfluence the US health-care system? Rose [22] described the pre-
ention paradox. Population-based interventions such as a reduc-
ion in salt intake in the diet can result in pronounced reductions
n the incidence of disease in the population as a whole; but the
enefits to each individual who participates are small. The treat-
ent paradox occurs in the setting of high-risk individuals. Iden-
ifying them and treating them aggressively are effective; but this
ostly and increasingly high-tech approach has little impact on
he incidence of disease in the population. American medicine is
est at this “rescue” style of medical practice. The increase in
ealth-care costs in America, driven by a large variety of vested
nterests ranging from diagnostics and therapeutics to hospitals
nd physicians, is unfortunately not caused by the absence of ev-
dence from comparative-effectiveness studies. Although new
omparative-effectiveness information may improve care or re-
uce costs in some settings, the incentives for implementation are
ften small or absent. In evidence development, it is important to
se the best methods and recognize the limitations of the data.
he results of observational studies can on occasion be used
ppropriately to advocate for randomized trials of effective-
ess. The methods of advocacy, counterdetailing, and other
opulation-based approaches will be essential for large-scale
mplementation.
Fortunately, CER comprises all study designs. Notwithstanding
he RECORD trial [14], randomized trials are the preferred method
or evaluating the effectiveness of drug therapies. Those of uswho
ope that our research findings will affect policy have a duty to
rovide a reliable and valid answer. To believewithout reservation
hat observational studies are often adequate to the task of eval-
ating the effectiveness of drugs may only serve paradoxically to
eopardize the health of the public. Observational studies are bet-
er suited to evaluate safety than effectiveness. Those of us who
ope that our research findings will influence policymay also rea-
onably expect resistance or adversarial responses from those
ho have a vested interest in the products affected by the new
vidence. Until controls on the perpetual use of new incompletely
valuated diagnostic and therapeutic strategies can be imple-
ented, low expectations aimed at incremental progress in both
he development and the implementation of evidence are likely to
e key to ongoing success.
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